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This paper examines the efrects of levy-grant scheme f()r 
employer-provided training in Korea. Constructing three-year 
P잉lcl data , 1 inves디gate whether the training gr밍lt intendecl 10 
encourage corporate training affects finn beha띠or and perfor 
mance. The major “nclings are that training grant stimulates 
corporate investment in training ancl ultimately leacls to the 
improvement in corporate perfonnance. These finclings su앓est 
that training levy-grant scheme might be one of institutional 
arrangements to cope with the uncler .. investment problem in 
traming. 
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I. In troduction 
The rapid advances in technological development and global 
competition have led to far-reaching changes in the corporate 
business environment. Skill development of workers becomes the 
underlying force of comp없ly’s sustainable compe디tive advantage .. n 
particular , becoming ever more important is employer-provided 
training aimed to enhance adaptability to change. This in-how,e 
effort is critical. because human resources in the external labor 
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market are readily available by any other company. and thus 
cannot seπe as a unique source of compe디디ve advantage. 
In order to promote corporate investment in training, Korea runs 
the Job Skill Development Program (JSDP) under the framework of 
the Employment Insurance System. Since 1995 when the JSDP was 
launched. the number of employer-provided training assisted by the 
JSDP has been increasing on the considerable scale. In 2002 , 
13.4% of the insured employees took part in the company training 
funded by the JSDP (Lee and Kim 2004). 
The JSDP is considered a type of the levy-grant scheme. in that 
government levies insurance payments on the businesses and uses 
this fund to subsidize part of the corporate training cost. The 
rationale behind the JSDP assumes the market failure that 
under-investment in job training is highly likely if left up to the 
corporate discretion. The externalities of job training, which bring 
more social benefits than private ones. would prevent businesses 
from investing at the level that is deemed adequate for societal 
needs. 
This paper examines the effects of levy-grant scheme for company 
training in Korea. But nobody knows what amount of investment in 
training is optimal for socie양. So this study will assess how 
government intervention in training affects firm behavior and 
performance indirectly. The key question is that whether the JSDP 
actually stimulated corporate training investment and ultimately led 
to the improvements in corporate performance. 
11. Previous Literature 
According to human capital theory. no externalities would occur 
and thus under-investment in training would not happen , i[ 
employer and its employees can reap the benefits at the level 
proportionate to the training expenses each incurred. To better 
understand this argument. let us take a closer look at the two 
distinct types of job training: specific and general training. 
The specific training is defined as training for skills that are o[ 
use exclusively at the firm providing it. Since the job skills 
acquired through such training cannot be put to use at other 
companies. the employees would be reluctant to bear the costs of 
training. Instead , covering for all training expenses. employer can 
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reap a11 the benefits of enhanced productivity brought about as a 
result of the training. Thus , specific trainín당 does not generate an 
externality problem either. But employer would not be able to enjoy 
the returns of investment in training if the trained employee quiis 
One of the ways of addressing this problem is to divide the cost:-
and benefits of training between the employer and employees. 
In contrast. general training cultivates job ski11s that would boosl 
productivity of not only the company providing it but any otheI 
competitor as well. As an employee ’s productivi낀 is raised in othel 
firms ‘ alternative wage offer will increase. Therefore. in a fully 
competitive labor market , the employee could exclusively reap tht 
benefit of general training, regardless of whether he/ she change" 
job. In this case ‘ the company wou.ld not bear the cost of training 
and no externalities would occur. 
However , in the real wo r1d , most training is likely to be neitheI 
purely firrn-specific nor purely general in nature. 1 Stevens (1994 
1996) proposes the term “ transferable training" for ski11s that ar t' 
useful to not a11 but more than one firm. The potential returns 0 • 
investment in such training may go to not only the company 
providing it but also the poaching company that hires the trainecl 
worker. Under these circumstances. the incentive for businesses to 
invest in employee training decreases. leading to under-investment 
There are other causes of under-investment in training: imper 
fections in the labor market due to information asymmetrγ ancl 
poor func디onln앙 of mechanisms for evaluating or recognizin앙 
competencies acquired by worker; imperfections in the capital 
market due to the inability to bear the costs of training because of 
credit constraints of worker; imperfections in the training market 
where information on the quality or outcomes of training is poor or 
where training might not be fully contractible; and the coordination 
failure between management and labor on reasonable allocation of 
costs and benefits (Booth and Snower 1996; and OECD 2003) 
lAccording to the OECD (2003) which analyzed the International Adult 
Literacy Surveμ ， firms fully pay for more than 70% of continuous traininl~ 
courses. Loewenstein and Spletzer (19띤8) show that employers bear nearlv 
all of the costs of formal training. even 당eneral training. Also training cosh 
are not transferred to the employees because their wages do not fall durin，~ 
the training period. Even more strikingly , training paid for by previou 3 
employers has a larger wage effect than training paid for by the current 
employer 
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There are various approaches by the govemrnent or labor and 
rnanagernent organizations to address the problern of rnarket failure 
in the field of job training. In France and Quebec province of 
Canada. the levy-exernp디on scherne is enforced. Under this scherne. 
a legal rninirnurn on training expense is established based on total 
payroll , and in the event this rninirnurn is not rnet, the difference 
between the legal rninirnurn arnount and the actual training 
expense is charged on the ernployer as an obliga디on. Countries 
such as Spain and Belgiurn irnplernent levy-grant schernes , under 
which a por디on of the total wages is levied on the ernployer to 
create a fund to be used to support ernployee training of the 
businesses. 2 The JSDP in Korea can be considered a levy-grant 
scherne. 
The governrnent intervention in job training of the private 
companies drew an array of criticisrns. Sorne of the potential 
problerns or drawbacks cited were that training regula디ons would 
lead to high adrninistrative costs , that the govemrnent would not 
adequately account for the qu혀ity of training , that the govemrnent 
could risk inefficient use of resources to support training, that 
regulations intended to prevent abuse of the subsidy prograrn could 
on the flip side pose as obstacles in rnee디ng the ch없1ges in 
cornpany’ s training needs , and that the large corporations would be 
main beneficiaries of the training grant progr밍n (OECD 2003; and 
Gasskov 200이 . 
But there are little ernpirical studies to assess whether 
institutional arrangernents intended to encourage corporate training 
run counter the under-investment problem effectively. Holzer et a l. 
(1993) is probably the only exceptional research to date on the 
ques디on of governrnent subsidy initiatives for ernployer-provided 
training. The Michigan state ran the Michigan Job Opportunity 
Bank-Upgrade (MJOB) prograrn during the years 1986-90 to foster 
training in the rnanufacturing sector. The prograrn provided 
one-tirne training grants for new technolo잉r-adopting rnanufacturers 
with 500 or fewer employees on a first-come first-serve basis. They 
suπeyed the cornpanies that applíed for the MJOB subsidies du디ng 
2 According to Gasskov (200이‘ countries that obligate employers to 
conduct job training are France , Denmark, India , Ireland , Malaysia, Nige디a ， 
Singapore , and many countries in South America. And countries that have 
labor and management create a training fund upon agreement are Belgium ‘ 
Denmark. and the Netherlands. 
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1988-9 , comparíng those that received the subsidy with those thHt 
did no t. With three-year panel data , they [ound that traimng 
subsidies had a significantly large effect on increasing a company' s 
training. 
Mean、.vhile ， there are growing bodies o[ empirical study on the 
productivity effects of training. This paper will review lhe m어( 'r 
empirical studies that have estimated the irnpact of training 011 
organizaUonal performance by using micro-data. 
Bishop (1991) used data on 2.594 ernployer survey under th c: 
Employrnent Opportunity Pilot Projects c:onducted by the Nation ‘ tl 
Center for Researc:h in Vocational Education in 1982. The suπey 
asked employers how much time was spent in the first thre c: 
months on formal training for the new hired. The ernployer also 
reported on the producti이ty of the typical individual hired at the 
end of two years with the firm. The productivity rating was the 
subjective measure made on a scale of 0 to 100. He estimated th c: 
effect of initial training during the first three rnonths of 
employrnent on productivity increase two years later. The estírnated 
l11arginal rate of return of 100 hours of training ranged from 1 1 (/0 
to 38% , depending on the esti l11ation model applied. The analysJs 
was confined to the effect of initíal training for the new hircd. And 
there is the proble l11 using subjec:Uve measure of productivity 
The Holzer e l. a l. (1993) study , introduced earlier , analyzed tJ:e 
effect of training on corporate performance using fir l11 level panel 
data. Using a model that controlled for the effects of unobservable 
firm characteristics ‘ they found that a doubling of worker trainirg 
reduced the scrap rate by 70/ü. They tried to correct for U:.e 
endogenei.ty problel11 of the training decision. But the limitation o[ 
this paper is that the data are retrospective. 
Bartel (1994) l11easured the impact of the for l11al trainiLg 
programs on labor producti띠양. She merged data conducted by 
Columbia Business School on 155 businesses in 1986 with each 
business’s 1983 information. The major finding is that business 
that were operating below their expected labor productivity levels in 
1983 implemented new e l11ployee 다aining programs after 1983 that 
resulted in significantly larger increases in labor productivity growth 
between 1983 and 1986. The limitation in this article is that two 
years ’ worth of data could not address the heterogeneity m 
productivity gro\\이h enough 
Black and Lynch (1 996) used data from national employe.-s 
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suπey conducted in 1994 by the National Center on Educational 
Quality of the Workforce (EQW). The suπey data included the 
characteristics of businesses in 1993 as well as information on the 
number of employees who have received training in 1990 and 1993. 
They estimated the effect of various types of investment in human 
capital on productiviψ. They found that the number of employees 
trained in 1990 and 1993 had no significant effect on produc디vity. 
but particular training methods and content had significant posi디ve 
effects. For manufacturing industry. the greater the share of time 
in formal off-the-job trading. the higher the productivity. For 
non-manufacturing industry. computer training contributed to 
enhance productiviψ. But the data used being cross-sectional. 
endogenei낀 could be a problem. In other words. the analysis fails 
to account for the possibility that a company’s performance level 
may affect its decision to invest in training. 
To address this drawback. Black and Lynch (1997) merged the 
data from Longitu띠n떠 Research Database of the U.S. Census 
Bureau with the manufacturers in the EQW data. Once the 
endogeneity problem is addressed. the posi디ve effect of training on 
productivity obseπed in the cross-sectional analysis disappears. 
Boon (1 998) estimated the rate of retum to training in Dutch 
manufacturing sector. A notable distinction of this analysis is that 
it took into account that training accumulates as human capital 
stock and applied depreciation rates for training investment during 
fixed time periods in a stock approach. The major finding is that 
human capital stock accumulated through training has a signi“cant 
and positive effect on productivity. However. depending on the 
assumptions on the depreciation rates. this effect changes sen-
sitively. 
Barrett and 0 ’Connell (2001) inves디gated the data derived from a 
merge of a 1993 suπey on continuous training and 1997 follow-up 
suπey in Ireland. They applied the distinction between general and 
specific training to the empirical task of es디mating the returns to 
in-company training. They found differential effects of the two types 
of training on productivity growth. Sta디S디C떠ly significant posi디ve 
effects on productivity are found for general training. but not for 
specific training. 3 
~hey explain that employees may react differently to the provision of the 
more valuable form of training. Employees can consider general training as 
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III. Data 
In order to analyze whether or not 삼1e training subsidy program 
fostered corporate investment in employee training and whether or 
not such training enhanced corporate performance. a set of firm-
level panel data is required. The data used in this study wa:3 
constructed from various data sets. 
The information on the subsidy provided to firms where trainin끽 
is provided by .JSDP can be obtained through the Employmenl 
[nsurance Database run by Ministry of Labor. This databas? 
conlains data on the amount of training subsidy‘ thc numbcr cl 
employees subject to training under the subsidy program by each 
establishmenL Since it was after 1999 that establishments with 
more than 1.000 workers were covered by the JSDP. although 
launched in July of 1995. the data used in this analysis was 
confìned to the years after 1999. 
The information on actual corporate investment in training other 
than the amount of training subsidy is required in order to 
exarnine whether training grants by JSDP boost in-company 
training. The measures related to corporate training investment may 
be the number of the trained employee. duration of traininμ. 
training expenditures. and so on. The training expendilure frorn 
Financial Statements compiled by the National Information and 
Credit Evaluation. Inc. is used as a measure of training inveslmer( 
in this study. A company‘s tra:ining expenditure goes on both 
Statemen l. oJ lncome and Statement oJ Cost 0.[ Goods ManuJacture ::1 
as πraining expenditure." The training expenditure on the Stale • 
menl of Income is expenditure on administrative and clerical 
employee잔. whereas the same item on the Statement qf Cost (?f 
Goods ManuJactured is expenditure on production workers. 
Therefore. in order to calculate total training expenditures of a 
company the two must be added. There remain practical difficultit s 
still ‘ since Financial Statements are available for only the companit:s 
listed on the Korea Stock Exchange and KOSDAQ and businesses 
subject to external audits. Even among these companies. it is rare 
to find instances in which training expenditures are placed on bo( h 
a gift from the employer. so they are likely to devote greater effort 0 
general training than to specific training. This in turn leads to highρI 
productivity effects of general training. 
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the Statement oJ Income and the Statement oJ Cost oJ Goods 
ManuJactured. Many companies only keep them on the Statement qf 
Income. Moreover , depending on the situation of the company ‘ 
training expenditures could be accounted for under a different 
account item name. Al야lOugh such possibili디es of measurement 
errors s디11 exis t, the Fínancial Statements are currently the sole 
sources of information on the actual training expenditure. Thus 
they are used in this study while recognizing this limitation. 1 
constructed a data cornprising just the companies listing “ training 
expenditure" on the Statement oJ Income or the Statement oJ Cost oJ 
Goods ManuJactured. In other words , the data in this study is 
limited to firms with non-zero training expenditures. This data 
contains inforrnation on a company'’ s characteristics and perfor-
mance including sales , tangible fixed assets , number of ernployees , 
industry , total wages , and trainìng expendìtures 
To merge the two sets of data , the amount of training subsidies 
by establìshment from Emploνment Insurance Database was 
summed up by the firm unit. Following this method. 1 have put 
together panel data on 644 companìes covering three years from 
1999 to 2001. The final panel data holds information on the 
amount of training subsidy obtained through the JSDP (hereinafter 
referred to as the training subsidyJ, actual training expenditure. 
and corporate characteristics and performance. 
Table 1 shows the characteristics of the panel data in 2001. The 
percentage of firms that received training subsidies stood at 88.5% 
in 200 1. illustra디ng that the sample distribution is skewed toward 
the JSDP-subsidized firms. In the sample. the proportion of 
companies that were beneficiaries of the JSDP steadily increased 
from 80.0% in 1999. to 87.6% in 2000. and 88.5% in 200 1. This 
skew to beneficiary firms is basically caused by the fact that my 
sample was lìmited to firms with non-zero training expenditures in 
Fínandal Statements. Therefore , the analysis presented hereafter 
does not set forth results that are representative of all Korean 
firms , but rather should be interpreted as a tentative analysis on 
the effects of the training subsidy program ‘ 
The companies recei띠ng training grants have a noticeably higher 
level of labor produc디vity. capital intensity. wages. ancl investment 
in training than the non-beneficiaries. Furtherrnore. the larger the 
size of the company is. the more grant it received. As the results 
clearly indicate. the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of training 
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TABLE 1 
SAMPLE CHARACfERISTJCS (2001) 
Total Non-Beneficiaries B n i i eneuclanes 
Annual per capita sales (mi1. KRW) 399.8 413.7 292.2 
(530.9) (550.8) (323 .6) 
Annual per capita ωced tangible assets 183.5 190.4 130.9 
(mil. KRV，끼 (323.7) (329. 1) (274.5) 
Monthly per capila wages 2.025.8 2.042.5 1.897.4 
(U10U. KRV，끼 (1 094.7) (1 .081.3) (1. 192.7) 
Annual per capHa tr없ning expenditure 255.5 272.6 124.3 
(버ou. KR\\끼 (464.0) (484.3) (220 .9) 
AnnuaJ per capila training subsidy 33.4 33.4 
amount (lhou. won) (39.1) 139.1) 
IndustηI Li방1t industry (share) 0 .194 0.186 0.257 
Heavy and chemlcaJ (share) 0.542 0 .549 0 ‘ 486 
Non-manufacturtng (share) 0.264 0.265 0 .257 
Síze -99 (share) 0.219 0 .184 0 .486 
1 00-299 (share) 0 .393 0.395 0.378 
300-499 (share) 0 .138 0 .147 0 .068 
500-999 (share) 0 .141 0 .153 0.054 
1.000- (share) 0.109 0.121 0.0]4 
Number of fìrms 644 570 74 
NOle: The figures in ( ) are standard devia l1ons. 
subSidy show a marked differen ce in the characteristics and 
performance of the businesses. Such differences can be resolved 
through the fixed effect model in analyzìng the effects of the 
training s ubsidy program. 
IV. The Effect of Training Subsidy Program on 
Stimu1ating Investment in Training 
This sec디on 없ms to analyze whether the trainìng subsidy 
program for employers by JSDP exped1ted InvestInent in employee 
tr없ning. The answer to this inquiry c하1 be sough t by looking into 
how training subsidy brought about increase in corporate training 
eX'Penditure. 1n paπicular. the rnain interest is placed on whether 
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the firms that was not subsidized one year but was subsidized in 
the next year increased its training expenditure. and vice versa. 
Table 2 shows the averages of 야le annual per capita training 
subsidy amount and the annual per capita training expenditure 
over two consecutive years. categorized according to whether or not 
subsidy was provided. Noteworthy here are two interesting findings. 
First. when a non-beneficiary comI요ny turned beneficiaIγ. per 
capita training expenditure went up rather dramatically. For 
example. a firm that was not subsidized in 1999 but was 
subsidized in 2000 posted an increase of KRW 79 thou. in annual 
per capita training expenditure. from KRW 126.9 thou. in 1999 to 
KRW 205.9 thou. in 2000. Similarly the figure also rose during the 
period 2000-1 by KRW 48.6 thou. The firms that fa11 under the 
“ unsubSidized=?subsidized" categOlγ recorded the greatest increase 
in per capita training expenditure compared to other categories of 
t r'aining subsidy status. 
Second. the increase in per capita training expenditure far 
outpaced the increase in training subsidy amount. For instance. 
per capita training subsidy for the “ unsubsidized in 1999걱sub­
sidized in 2000" categoIγ rose by KRW 1 l.6 thou .. but their per 
capita training expenditure jumped much more substantia11y by 
KRW 79 thou .. 
The above summary statistics only shows the change in the 
average per capita training expenditure caused by the changes in 
the training subsidy without controlling other factors that may 
impact corporate decision of training. This study 、씨11 examine 
whether the corporate training subsidy program promotes corporate 
investment in training. even when other factors that may influence 
corporate training investment are contro11ed. 
The model used for the estimation is as fo11ows: 
L1 0i 二 ao + a 1 Grantji + a2 L1 Xji + Eji 
where J and t denote the firm and time. respectively. 
Since this study attempts to find out whether the training 
subsidy progr밍n spurred on corporate investment in training. the 
amount of change in per capita training expenditure (L1 n was set 
as the dependent variable. The variables related to the training 
subsidy progr없n (Grant) were used two types. One is the variable 
indicating the change in the status of subsidy. namely the dummy 
TABLE 2 
T꺼E EFFECT OF TRAlNING SUBsroy ON CORPORATE TRAINING INVESTMENT 
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variables of “unsubsidized걱subsidized. " “subsidized=카msubsidized." 
The other is the change of amount in per capita training subsidy. 
because the amount of training subsidy varies even 밍nong the 
subsidized firms. 
In addition. per capita sales. the number of workers. capita1 
intensity. and per capita wage were used as explanatory variables 
(L1 X) affecting c아porate training investment. Improvement in 
business performance as measured by per capita sales can bring 
about greater investment in employee training. The growth in 
corporate size. on one hand. can lead to more demand for training. 
but on the other hand a greater number of workers could bring 
down the per capita training expenditure. Increases in capital 
intensity may further necessitate the training of workers handling 
machinery and equipment. Per capita wage is taken as an indicator 
that represents the quality of workers. In general. training invest-
ment is likely to rise for high-quality workers. In the meantime. as 
the amount of change in corporate training investment could vaπ 
depending on the industIγ to which a firm belongs. the non-
manufacturing industry was set up as a reference variable with 
both the light industry and heavy chemical industry added as 
dummy variables. Also the dummy variable of year was included to 
control business cycles and other factors that may affect all firms. 
The estimated results showed in Table 3 are generally in line 
with expectations. Looking at the effect of the training subsidy 
program on corporate investment in training tells us that training 
subsidy do accelerate corporate training expenditure. In Model (1). 
with other factors controlled. it was found that newly subsidized 
firms increased training investment more drastically compared to 
the firms with no changes in subsidy status. On the other hand. 
when formerly subsidized firms stop recei띠ng training subsidy. 
their investments in training tended to drop. In Model (2). the 
amount of per capita training subsidy significantly boosted per 
capita training expenditure 
Such estimated results imply that. although the training subsidy 
program could hand out windfalls to some companies pro띠ding 
training. the windfall effect is not big enough to offset the effect of 
stimulating training investment. 
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TABLE 3 
ESTIMATION ON T J-I E EFF'ECTS OF TRAINING S UBSIDY ON CORPORATE 
INVESTMENT IN TRAJNING 
Dependent variable = L1 ln (per capita tra ining expenditurel 
(1) (2) 
Conslanl 0.31 9 (0 . 073γ 0 .092 (0 .072) 
247 
L1 ln (Sales ) 0.356 (0.085)*** 0 .341 (0.085)*** 
L1 ln (Number of employees) 
L1 ln (Capital intensity) 
L1 ln (per capita wage) 
Industry [Non-manufacturing industry] 
Light industry 
Heavy and chemical industry 
Training subsidy variable 
1. Changes in training subsidy status 
[unchangedJ 
0 .127 (0. 104) 0 .114 (0.]02) 
-0 .014 (0.064) -0.021 (0.063) 
ð.630 (0 .087)*** 0 .631 (0 .086)*** 
-0.022 (0.093) -0.009 (0.092) 
-0.023 (0.074) -0 .010 (0.073) 
unsubsidized=>subsidized 0.247 (0. 102)** 
subsidized=킹unsubsid.ized -0.40 1 (0 . 12끼*** 
2 . J In (per capita anlount of training 0 .054 (O.008)*h 
subsidy) 
Year 2001 -0.152 (0 .064)** -0 .129 (0.063)** 
Adj R-Sq. 0.103 0 . 120 
N 1.288 
Notes: The figures in ( ) are standard errors. And the vaηables ìn [ J are 
reference variables. * statìstic머ly significant at the 10% level; ** at 
삼le 5% level: and *** at 야le 1% level. 
V. The Effect of Training on Corporate Performance 
In this study the Cobb-Douglas production function model W élS 
used to analyze the effect of a fìrm’s investrnent in training on i':s 
performance. There are t:\νo inputs in produc디on function. capita.l 
and effec tive labor. The latter means the labor sen끼ce actua1 ly 
pro씨ded by an employed worker 미at the company employs. 
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Y=AKβ (eL) Y (1) 
The effectiveness of labor (e) is supposed as indicator of increases 
in the human capital accumulated in trained worker. In this study 
the effectiveness of labor is the function of training as follows. 4 
e=T8 、 O 르 8 드 l (2) 
Therefore , if training is not provided , the effective labor (eL) 
equals the number of employed workers (L). And if training 
investment is made , the effective labor (eL) is larger than the 
number of employed workers (L). 
If equation (2) is put into equa디on (1), the production function is 
changed as indicated below. 
Y二AKβ (LTθ) y (3) 
If equation (3) is divided by the number of workers and takes 
natural logarithm , it changes into the following equation. 
ln(Y / L) = lnA + ß ln(K/ L) + (ß + r • l )lnL+ θ rlnT (4) 
The estimation equa디on is converted as follows , j and t denoting 
firm and time. 
ln(Y / L)jt = bo + b Iln(K/ L)jt + b21nIνt+b31n1jt+ 터l (5) 
Estimates of the coefficient on the variable T will be biased if the 
error term ( 감tl is correlated with T. This could be happen if the 
error term includes heterogeneity across firms in their technologies 
and type of output that are not observable ( 까) . 
Ejt= T}j+ μjt (6) 
In this study the fixed effect model is used to eliminate the 
unobservable firm-specific effects through the first difference 
4If a trained worker leaves his firm , the human capital created by 
training is lost for the firm. But it is assumed that labor mobility can be 
ignored in the short term. 
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method 
Thus , the final estimation equation is as shown in (7) below 
ln(Y / L);I -ln(Y / L)μ 1 = b J(ln(K/ L)jl -ln(K/ L );r;) 
+ b2 (lnÝI -lnlσI Il + b3 (lnT;1 -lnT;1 -1) +끼1-/1μ I (7) 
1n the estimation equation , per capita sales is used as the 
dependent variable ,5 and the per c:apita training expenditure as the 
training investment variable. Added to the explanatOlγ variables is 
the industry variable that may affect the productivity. And the year 
dummy i든’ also used to control the effect of economic f1uctuatioll 
lhat may have in f1uence on all firms. 
Model (1) of Table 4 shows that an increase in capital intensily , 
which means investment, enhances productivity. And an increase in 
employment was found to lower productivity. This may be either 
due to the diminishing returns to scale or because the procluctivity 
of new recruits is lower than that of the existing employees. No\\ ‘ 
let us take a look at the effect o[ training on corporate perfor 
mancc , which is our main concern. The estimated result shows 
that the more training investment a firm makes , the mor'~ 
significantly its productivity increases. 
Model 1( 2) and (3) show how the change in training subsidy 
status affects their performance. Model (2) indicates that produc-
tivity rises more for the formerly unsubsidized firms that are no\V 
subsidized than those that did not experience any change in 
subsidy status. Conversely, the productivity of the firms that 
received training subsidy, but now do not get them , did nct 
increase ‘ 1n Model (3), per capita training subsidy amount had a 
significant positive effect on the corporate producti띠ty. The above 
findings 5uggest that training subsidy through the JSDP enhances 
corporate performance to some degree by augmenting corporate 
investment in training. 
'It would be better to use per capita value added as productiviiy variabl ，ζ 
blll llnfortunaiely no relevani information was available in the data used for 
this study. Me따lwhile ， per capita raw materi<ù cost should have been 
controlled when the 、rariable of per capiia sales was used , bui it also fa i!ed 
dlle io absence of relevant information 
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TABLE 4 
ESTlMATION ON THE EFþECf OF TRAINING ON CORPORATE PERFORMANcE 
Dependenl variable = L1 ln (Per capita s외es) 
L1 ln (Capltal intensity) 
L1 ln (Number of employees) 
Ll ln (Per capita trairung expenditure) 
1γaining subsldy status [unchangedl 
unsubsidized-후subsidized 
subsidized격unsubsidized 
L1 ln (Per capiLa σ앙ning subsidy amount) 
lndust.ry INon-manufacturtng Indust.ry] 
Llght indust.ry 




(1) (2) (3) 
0.190 (0.02 1)*** 0.203 (0.022)**' 0.202 (0.022)*** 





0.025 (0.027) 0.025 (0.028) 0.032 (0.027) 
0.012 (0.018) 0.015 (0.0191 0.019 (0.0181 
0.009 (0.020) -0.003 (0.020) 0‘ 001 (0.020) 
0.128 0.085 0.086 
1.288 
Notes: The figures in ( ) are standard errors. And the variables in I J are 
reference variables. *** statistica11y sign퍼cant at 삼le 10% level. 
VI. Conclusion 
This study intends to examine the effects of subsìdy program for 
company training in Korea. 1 constructed pane1 data over three 
years from 1999 to 2001. πle major fin<피ngs from the an외ysis are 
as follows : 
First‘ training subSidy program encourages corporate investment 
in σaining. Recei띠ng training subsidy and the amount of per 
capita training subsidy through 삼le JSDP signific없띠y increase the 
corporate train뇨19 investment. 
Second. employer-provided tr리ning significan디y contributed to 
enhance firm‘s producti띠양. 
Third. the provision of the training subsidy to firms and per 
capita training subsidy were a1so discovered to significantly boost 
corporate productivity. 
The above findings show that as a leηr-gr밍1t scheme. the Job 
Skill Development Progr없n contributes to improving corporate 
perform없lce by encouraging corporate investment in tr없ning. This 
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means that the training subsidy does not simply provide a windfall 
for subsiclized firms. 
This study has limitations as follows. The sample firms in panel 
data are not representative of a11 firms nationwide. and biased 1.0 
the subsidized firms because the data is limited to firms v.이th 
non-zero training expenditures. Moreover. the study has not gone 
far enough to analyze the long-term effec:ts of the tralning subsidy 
progr밍n ， as the data used here are those co11ected over a relatively 
short period of only three years. In making estimation. the stuc1y 
could control the unobservable corporate characteristics by using 
the fíxed effect model. but failed to fix the simultaneous bié.S 
between trainin당 decision and corporate performance.6 
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